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Abstract
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions has the ‘co-benefit’ of also reducing air pollution and
associated impacts on human health. Here, we incorporate health co-benefits into estimates of the
optimal climate policy for three different climate policy regimes. The first fully internalizes the
climate externality at the global level via a uniform carbon price (the ‘cooperative equilibrium’),
thus minimizing total mitigation costs. The second connects to the concept of ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’ where nations coordinate their actions while accounting for different
national capabilities considering socioeconomic conditions. The third assumes nations act only in
their own self-interest. We find that air quality co-benefits motivate substantially reduced
emissions under all three policy regimes, but that some form of global cooperation is required to
prevent runaway temperature rise. However, co-benefits do warrant high levels of mitigation in
certain regions even in the self-interested case, suggesting that air quality impacts may expand the
range of possible policy outcomes whereby global temperatures do not increase unabated.
1. Introduction
Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has the
‘co-benefit’ of also reducing air pollution, which is the
leading environmental risk factor for disease globally;
exposure to ambient fine particulate matter (PM2.5)
is alone responsible for an estimated 7.5–10.3 mil-
lion deaths globally per year [1]. A large number of
studies have quantified the air quality-related bene-
fits that would occur given various GHG reduction
scenarios, for example the implementation of specific
policies or the achievement of specific climate tar-
gets [2–5]. These studies generally find that reducing
GHG emissions can lead to large benefits for soci-
ety, both in human health and economic terms, and
thus should provide strong additional incentive for
climate action.
Existing studies also find, however, that the health
co-benefits from improved air quality will be dis-
tributed unevenly across space and time [2–5]. Some
nations will experience large health co-benefits while
others will not, and some will benefit early on
while others experience more gradual improvements.
These factors may influence how countries account
for health co-benefits when designing their climate
policies.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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In this paper, we use a recently developed cost-
benefitmodel to analyze howhealth co-benefits influ-
ence optimal climate policy design under three dif-
ferent perspectives of international cooperation. The
first fully internalizes the climate externality at the
global level via a uniform carbon price (the ‘cooper-
ative equilibrium’), thus minimizing total mitigation
costs. The second connects to the concept of ‘com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities’ where nations
coordinate their actions to acknowledge different
national capabilities considering socioeconomic con-
ditions and produces welfare optimal outcomes that
account for background inequalities [6, 7]. This scen-
ario is particularly salient, given increased attention
that justice and equity considerations are currently
receiving in the climate policy debate [8–10] and
may serve as an alternative anchor for climate nego-
tiations. The third approach assumes that nations
act only in their own rational self-interest instead of
cooperating, taking the actions of others as given (the
‘Nash equilibrium’). Health co-benefits are especially
important for an accurate estimate of climate policies
that are in a nation’s rational self-interest because
most health co-benefits accrue locally and in the near-
term, in contrast to many of the benefits from CO2
reductions.
2. Methods
We conducted all modeling using the RICE + AIR
cost-benefit integrated assessment model [11]. We
describe the core components of the model below,
though both RICE [12, 13] and AIR [11] have been
described in detail elsewhere.We then explain howwe
use the model to implement the three policy regimes.
2.1. The RICEmodel
The Regionalized Integrated Climate Economy
(RICE) model is a cost-benefit model widely used
by researchers and governments to estimate the social
cost of carbon and optimal climate policy [12–14].
Briefly, RICE is a regionalized optimization model
that includes an economic component and a geo-
physical (climate) component that are linked. RICE
divides the world into 12 regions, some of which are
single countries while others are groups of countries.
Each region has a distinct endowment of economic
inputs including capital, labor, and total factor pro-
ductivity, which together produce that region’s gross
output via a Cobb–Douglas production function.
Capital accumulates via a savings rate, which adds
investment to the stock of capital in the next time
period as a percentage of net output in the current
period; at the same time, the stock of capital depre-
ciates at an exogenous rate. Baseline regional carbon
emissions are computed as the product of gross out-
put and an exogenously determined, region-specific
carbon intensity pathway. These carbon emissions
can be reduced (mitigated) at a cost to gross output
via emission control policies. Any remaining car-
bon emissions enter the climate module where they
influence global temperature and, ultimately, the eco-
nomy through climate-related damages, which affect
regions differently. The optimal policy maximizes an
objective function that balances these various costs
and benefits (see below).
We make three changes to the standard version
of RICE, which we have described in detail elsewhere
[11, 15–17]. First, we update the population pro-
jections using data from the UN World Population
Prospects. Second, we update the exogenous radiat-
ive forcing to values used in RCP6.0, which aligns
with the latest versions of DICE (the global counter-
part to RICE) [18]. Third, none of our solution con-
cepts involves Negishi weights in the objective func-
tion [11, 17].
More specifically, our version of RICE employs a
discounted and separable constant elasticity object-
ive function with population weights (equation (1)),
where W denotes social welfare, L population, c per
capita consumption, ρ the rate of pure time pref-
erence and η inequality aversion (diminishing mar-
ginal utility). The subscripts i and t are the region and
time indices respectively. Unless otherwise noted, we
assume the default discounting parameters in RICE










We recently developed the Aerosol Impacts and
Responses (AIR) module to introduce the air qual-
ity dimension into RICE [11]. AIR creates a feedback
mechanism whereby reducing CO2 also reduces air
pollutant emissions from co-emitting sources, thus
capturing two key impacts: (a) the public health
benefit from improved air quality, and (b) the cli-
mate impacts associated with near-term temperature
increases attributable to reductions in air pollutant
emissions (several air pollutants are also climate for-
cers and together produce net warming overall).
The approach underlying the AIR module con-
sists of five steps: First, we estimate the baseline
(before carbon mitigation) emissions of primary
PM2.5, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, organic car-
bon, and black carbon for all region-time pairs
with income-dependent emission intensity projec-
tions (emissions per unit GDP) based on the GAINS
model [19]. Specifically, we assume air pollutant
emissions in the coming decades follow the ECLIP-
SEV5a baseline scenario, which includes current and
planned air quality legislation, but no climate policy.
Second, we determine the change in air pollutant
emissions that would result from a change in CO2
emissions using information embedded in the Shared
2
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Socioeconomic Pathway project [20]. Third, we link
changes in air pollutant emissions to changes in
estimated average human exposure to PM2.5 by apply-
ing the source receptor matrix from the TM5-FASST
model [21]. This enables a calculation of the number
of life-years gained from reduced premature mortal-
ity [22, 23]. Fourth, we estimate global temperature
changes from air pollutant emission co-reductions
using coefficients derived from the MAGICC climate
model [24]. Finally, we monetize the impacts by mul-
tiplying the estimated life-years gained by a value of a
life-year, estimated as two years of regional per cap-
ita income. Note that the use of regional per capita
income does not mean that life-years are worth less
in poorer regions, because of the transformation that
occurs via the η parameter [11]. After this valuation,
aerosol impacts can feed directly into the standard
RICE optimization without further modification.
The three fundamental high-level equations are as
follows, beginning with equation (2), which estimates








Baseline emissions for a given pollutant p in each
region-time pair (it) is a function of an emissions
intensity factor, αitp, and output, Yit. The emission
intensity (emissions per unit of output) is region
and pollutant specific and depends on the per cap-
ita income level of the region, defined above as the
output divided by the population, Lit. Emissions after
a given level of CO2 mitigation, Eitp, are a function
of the baseline emissions, E0itp, the carbon mitigation
rate, µit, and a scale factor, κ, that relates a percentage
reduction in CO2 emissions to a percentage reduction
in aerosol emissions (equation (3)) and are specific to
each pollutant. We use scale factors from the Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways [20]. This change in aero-
sol emissions from mitigation, ∆E, can be conver-
ted to a change in human exposure to air pollution,
∆Cit, using a pollutant-specific source-receptor mat-
rix, SRp,as in equation (4):










We assume that changes in exposure fromPM2.5, NOx
and SO2 are additive (black and organic carbon are
used only for climate purposes—see below) and that
emission reductions in one region only affect that
same region. Attributing a change in exposure into an
estimate of years of life lost is straightforward using
well-established methods [23, 25] that we do not
repeat here, except to note that we assume a log-linear
exposure-response function for all-cause mortality,
based on a World Health Organization meta-analysis
[22]. A single function for all-cause mortality enables
the use of internally consistent long-term (2100) pro-
jections of population and mortality from the UN.
This approach generally produces higher attribut-
able mortality burdens when compared to the cause-
specific Integrated Exposure–Response functions, but
more comparable burdens to those estimated by the
newer Global Exposure Mortality Model [1, 26, 27].
As mentioned above, the AIR module also
includes the climate ‘co-costs’ into the modeling
approach. Specifically, equation (3) already estim-
ates the post-mitigation level of emissions for the
relevant pollutants. The net global radiative forcing
attributable to these pollutants is taken as the sum of
the individual contributions. We estimate the indi-
vidual contributions by multiplying post-mitigation
emission levels with a coefficient relating a unit of pol-
lutant to a change in global radiative forcing, which
in turn influences global temperature. These rela-
tionships were derived through runs of the MAGICC
climate model [24], by observing the change in global
temperature that results from an emission pulse. The
total temperature rise above preindustrial levels for
any period then represents the combined temperat-
ure effects of air pollutants, CO2, and other GHG
emissions. This temperature change leads to climate
damages through the model’s internal climate dam-
age function.
After adding these radiative forcing effects, the
model accounts for both of the major impacts from
reducing air pollutant emissions; the health co-
benefits and the climate co-harms.
2.3. Modeling different policy regimes
The modeling capabilities outlined above allow for
novel analyses of optimal climate policy given poten-
tial synergies and tradeoffs between climate impacts,
mitigation costs, air quality factors and socioeco-
nomic inequality. These factors can be explored
under a range of policy regimes and under different
assumptions about the relative priority society gives
to future generations and the poor. Here we model
three different policy perspectives about international
cooperation:
(a) Cost minimization (cooperative equilibrium): the
key assumption here is that the recommended
climate policy is implemented in order to max-
imize (discounted) global wellbeing according to
equation (1), subject to the constraint of a uni-
form global carbon price. Economists often con-
sider a uniform global carbon price to be the
gold-standard solution to the climate problem
because itminimizes costs for any desired level of
global mitigation. An in-depth treatment of how
3
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co-benefits influence this solution can be found
in Scovronick et al [11].
(b) Regional Equity: it is possible to remove the
above constraint of a globally uniform carbon
price and instead allow for differentiated car-
bon prices for each region, such that all regions’
prices together maximize the global utilitarian
objective of equation (1) [6, 28]. The imme-
diate implication is that the optimal carbon
price paths are different across regions and thus
the decarbonization pathways differ from those
in the cost minimization (CM) scenario. In
this case, richer regions are allowed to contrib-
ute more mitigation effort than poorer regions
via higher carbon prices, thus enabling poorer
regions to continue developing. Arguably, this
approach allows the model to calculate optimal
distribution given the equity objective represen-
ted by equation (1), together with an assumption
that future inequality will not be corrected by
other means. More generally, removing the uni-
form price constraint allows better representa-
tion of values of justice, and can be viewed as one
implementation of the principle of ‘common
but differentiated responsibilities and respect-
ive capabilities’ of nations, as articulated in
the UNFCCC [28, 29] (note that recent work
[9] highlights alternative price differentiation
frameworks, such as equalizing relative regional
mitigation cost shares, and points to important
policy challenges that may arise from tradeoffs
between economic efficiency goals and concerns
for equity). The regional equity (RE) case can
be conceptualized as a second-best policy from
an economic efficiency perspective, optimized
to a situation in which massive global income
inequality is known to loom uncorrected in the
background [30].
(c) Self-Interest (non-cooperative equilibrium): here,
nations act entirely within their own self-interest
whenweighing the costs ofmitigation against the
climate and health benefits; their selected climate
policy does not consider the wellbeing of citizens
of other regions. This can be implemented using
an open-loop ‘Nash Equilibrium’ approach, as in
Nordhaus [12]. The Nash Equilibrium satisfies
a number of standard assumptions about stra-
tegic behavior, namely that nations maximize
their own net benefits by taking into account the
actions of other nations, there is no cooperation
between nations, and in equilibrium no nation
would benefit by unilaterally changing its chosen
actions. This regime does not produce a globally
optimal cooperative outcome—it is optimal only
in the sense of being the most favorable outcome
for each self-interested region conditional on the
same self-interested choices by all other regions.
These results are policy relevant, as they aim to
quantify the emissions reductions that may be
most politically feasible for nations tomake. Fur-
thermore, once these levels are quantified, they
support a strong argument that any nation mak-
ing less than these reductions is acting contrary
to its own self-interest.
3. Results
Figure 1 reports optimal policy results in terms of
cumulative carbon emissions (top panel) and associ-
ated temperature increase (bottom panel) given the
three policy regimes, both without (‘reference case’)
and with air quality co-benefits. In the reference
case of both cooperative scenarios, optimal cumulat-
ive emissions are approximately 1250 GtC globally,
which limits peak temperature rise to about 3 ◦C.
Despite the relatively similar emissions and temper-
ature profiles at the global level, however, the regions
that emit clearly differ. For example, Africa emits
much more in the RE case compared to the CM case
because the former gives more priority to socioeco-
nomic differences in determining optimal policy. In
the self-interest (SI) reference case, where nations do
not consider the wellbeing of people in other parts of
the world, global emissions end up more than three
times higher, leading to runaway temperature rise.
Emissions fall substantially in all three regimes
after accounting for air quality co-benefits. In the two
cooperative regimes, the added incentive provided by
the co-benefits makes it optimal to keep emissions
below the ‘trillionth tonne’ [31]. In contrast, in the SI
regime, the added incentive is not sufficient to avoid
very high temperatures.
The total global emissions in the SI case, how-
ever, mask important outcomes in several key regions
(figure 2). In the SI regime, all regions show some-
what increased mitigation in the co-benefits case
compared to the corresponding reference case, but
the differences are most pronounced in China, Sub-
Saharan Africa and in particular, India. Without co-
benefits, India pursues modest mitigation through-
out this century; with co-benefits it decarbonizes fully
by ∼2070. The same effect underlies the differences
in these regions between the co-benefits and reference
cases in the RE regime. On the other hand, in most of
the high-emitting regions (e.g. Europe, USA, Japan),
health co-benefits provide relatively little additional
incentive to mitigate, either because the air is already
clean or because carbon emissions and air pollution is
less strongly coupled. For these regions, high mitiga-
tion levels are only warranted in a cooperative regime,
where they mitigate to avoid climate impacts that
will primarily harm other regions (see supplement-
ary figure 1 (available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/
16/055027/mmedia) for the carbon price pathways
associated with each mitigation trajectory).
The finding that health co-benefits in the SI
regime do not motivate global mitigation sufficient
4
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Figure 1. Optimal cumulative emissions by region under each policy regime (panel (a)), and associated temperature trajectories
(panel (b)). Cumulative emissions (gigatonnes of carbon, GtC) start at 462 Gt to reflect global historical emissions.
5
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Figure 2. Optimal mitigation in the CM, RE and SI regimes, with and without co-benefits.
to avoid dangerous climate change is robust to a num-
ber of sensitivity analyses, including an assumption of
much worse climate impacts, or if the avoided deaths
are valued according to the value of a statistical life
(instead of by life-years) (supplementary figure 2). In
fact, keeping temperature increases in the SI regime
below 3.5 ◦C entails either near-zero discounting or
much higher levels of health or other co-benefits (or
higher valuations) (supplementary figure 2, supple-
mentary table). A combination of factors could also
achieve that outcome.
The complexity of climate policy decision-
making, and the importance of health co-benefits,
is further evident from figure 3, which reports
the normalized regional mitigation costs relative
to the monetized benefits (both from avoided cli-
mate impacts and improved air quality) under all
three policy regimes, reported in present value. In all
regions, some level of mitigation occurs in the SI case,
meaning that business-as-usual without any climate
policy is sub-optimal. Which of the three regimes is
most preferable, however, varies substantially across
regions. At one extreme, are several wealthy regions
(e.g. Russia, Japan, USA) where the self-interested
perspective is clearly preferable to the alternatives;
mitigation costs are relatively low, especially com-
pared to Regional Equity, but total benefits are still
substantial because the climate benefits (avoided cli-
mate damages) they get come almost exclusively from
climate action in other regions. Note though, that
expressing these wellbeing impacts in present-day
discounted terms masks variation in how costs and
benefits evolve over time for the three policy scenarios
(supplementary figure 3).
For a number of other regions, more favor-
able outcomes occur under one of the cooperative
regimes. In Africa for example, large net benefits
accrue in all regimes, but particularly with RE where
they do not decarbonize rapidly but gain from high
levels of mitigation in other, wealthier regions. India,
like Africa, strongly benefits under all three regimes,
but unlike in Africa, this is contingent in large part on
the health co-benefits. China’s benefits are split more
evenly between climate and health. This regional het-
erogeneity implies that, in purely cost-benefit terms,
regions where a cooperative regime is superior to the
SI regime will prefer some sort of negotiated outcome
(and vice versa).
4. Discussion
We have evaluated the role of air quality-related
health co-benefits on optimal climate policy under
three widely discussed policy regimes. In all three,
the inclusion of health co-benefits motivates substan-
tial reductions in global emissions. In the globally
cooperative CM regime that prioritizes least-costmit-
igation via a uniform global carbon price, all coun-
tries decarbonize more quickly, driven by the large
health co-benefits gained in relatively few, mostly
developing, regions (see also Scovronick et al [11]). In
the other cooperative regime (RE), which is sympath-
etic to the principle of common-but-differentiated
responsibilities, the health co-benefits motivate sub-
stantially more mitigation in several lower-income
regions that would not have been expected to mit-
igate much otherwise. In both of these cooperative
6
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 055027 N Scovronick et al
Figure 3. Normalized present value of per capita costs and
benefits under all three policy scenarios in the optimum
with co-benefits. The bars show the three types of impacts
to each region under the CM, RE, and SI scenario. Future
impacts are discounted and normalized by the marginal
utility of world average consumption in the first period
[32]. This normalization allows us to express regional
impacts in welfare terms and captures the idea that one
dollar of consumption has a larger effect on well-being in
low-income regions relative to high-income ones. The units
of welfare impacts for any given region can be interpreted
as the level of consumption that would cause an equivalent
change in well-being for a hypothetical person living at the
world average per capita consumption level (∼8305 USD in
2005 PPP). For instance, under the RE policy scenario, the
benefits to a person living in India are equivalent to a more
than $2000 increase in consumption for a person living at
the world average per capita consumption level. The
corresponding benefits for the United States are equivalent
to a less than $100 consumption increase for this
hypothetical person. The normalization, from Fankhauser
et al [32], is described in more detail in the supplementary
information.
regimes, the health co-benefits ensure that the world
keeps emissions below the ‘trillionth tonne’ threshold
that would not have been optimal otherwise, and that
global temperature rise therefore remains well below
3 ◦C.
In contrast, the SI regime produces runaway tem-
perature rise regardless of whether health co-benefits
are included. This occurs because in several high-
emitting regions, the capacity for co-benefits is relat-
ively low and does not outweigh additionalmitigation
costs. These regions also benefit from climate action
elsewhere. If we assume wealthier nations opt for
self-interest, our results imply that limiting optimal
global temperature rise to anything close to the Paris
Agreement targets would require that they: (a) accrue
health co-benefits that are much larger (or are valued
much more highly) than what we estimate here; (b)
gain other types of co-benefits beyond those related to
air quality, (c) find a way to dramatically reduce mit-
igation costs, and/or (d) assume a very low discount
rate in present-day decision making.
In reality, however, the world contains a hetero-
geneousmix of climate policy perspectives, with some
more oriented towards self-interest and others more
towards cooperation. Different combinations of these
perspectives can yield meaningful climate action; for
instance, if historically high-emitting regions (e.g.
USA, Europe, Japan) act strongly for reasons of global
efficiency or justice, while other newly high-emitting
regions (India, China) act to gain health co-benefits.
In fact, health co-benefits alone provide India a strong
incentive to mitigate: in both the RE and SI regimes,
including health co-benefits flips their optimal mitig-
ation over this century from very little to 100%. This
occurs due to India’s high benefit-cost ratio once the
health impacts from improved air quality are accoun-
ted for, an observation that has been reported else-
where in analyses of explicit climate targets [2].
Our results connect to other important discus-
sions of global climate policy. Our findings build on
prior studies that call into question the ‘lack of cred-
ibility/lack of trust’ objection to mitigation voiced
by some (generally rich) nations, because India and
other key regions clearly have a self-interested reason
to act strongly [2]. In addition, the non-cooperative
equilibrium estimates the minimally rational climate
policy for individual nations, which may be a useful
metric for the global stocktake that evaluates the ini-
tial round of NDCs in the post-Paris international cli-
mate regime [33]. We provide a high-level estimate of
that equilibrium for 12 macro-regions; for domestic
policy purposes, these estimates should be supple-
mented with more detailed, region-specific process-
based modeling.
This study has several important limitations.
First, RICE + AIR is a stylized reduced-form model,
which allows for computational efficiency when
identifying an optimal policy. We recommend
using ‘bottom-up’ (process-based) integrated assess-
ment models that include explicit technological
representation to analyze the details of any specific
mitigation scenario [34–37]. Second, we conducted
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our analysis with a 12-region global model, which
assumes each region behaves as a single unit. This
is sound for the single country regions (e.g. USA,
China, India), but does not account for heterogeneity
within the large multi-country regions (e.g. Africa,
Latin America). This assumption is likely most prob-
lematic for the SI scenario, where individual countries
are the ideal unit of analysis. Although no optimizing
cost-benefit climate policy model represents any-
thing close to the ∼195 countries in the world, the
result of a SI scenario with such a model would likely
entail even less mitigation because smaller decision
units would be internalizing even less of the climate
harms that their emissions cause. Third, our mod-
eling assumes that the health benefits of improved
air pollution are fully internalized into decision
making. In reality, we know this is not always the
case or the air would likely already be cleaner than
it is [38].
Finally, ourmodeling framework contains a num-
ber of parametric uncertainties. We test several of
these in sensitivity analyses and do not find large
changes to our qualitative results. One important
uncertainty that we did not consider concerns how
much regions would clean up their air independ-
ently of climate policy measures, which could be
done relatively cheaply in some cases with end-
of-pipe technology [11]. Instead, we assumed that
this autonomous air pollution policy would unfold
according to a current legislation scenario, which
may be somewhat conservative; if the air ends up
cleaner than expected, it would likely mean fewer co-
benefits and thus lower levels of optimal mitigation
(also see [11]).
There have been only a small number of other
global cost-benefit optimization studies that include
health co-benefits [11, 39, 40]. These studies have
similarly reported the importance of co-benefits in
climate policy decisions, though none has evalu-
ated or compared all three policy regimes analyzed
here.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that air quality co-benefits play
an important role in motivating climate action. In
cooperative policymaking scenarios, the co-benefits
help justify levels ofmitigation that begin to approach
those targeted in the Paris Agreement. In contrast,
in a purely self-interested scenario the co-benefits
are not nearly sufficient at the global level to meet
those targets, but do warrant high levels of mitiga-
tion in a few important regions that would other-
wise have much less reason to act. In a reality where
countries are likely to adopt a patchwork of policy
perspectives, health co-benefits expand the possibil-
ities by which the world avoids runaway temperature
rise.
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